We study the impact of Arthur Andersen's declining reputation on their clients. When Andersen clients issue seasoned equity, we find that the negative reaction to SEO announcements is two percent worse for SEOs audited by Andersen versus other Big Five firms. A median firm in our sample loses $31.4 million more than a non-Andersen client. This result supports the argument that the certifying and monitoring role of auditors is valuable to clients. We do not find any unusual underpricing for SEOs or for IPO firms audited by Arthur Andersen. However, we do find that Andersen clients suffered significant value losses (approximately two percent) surrounding two key events: the admission of error by Andersen's CEO and the announcement of the criminal indictment against Andersen. We find that these results are driven by the large firms in our sample implying that only large firms' stock is affected by the deteriorating reputation of Andersen.
Introduction
The impact of a service provider's reputation on its clients has been a topic of great interest in the literature. However, the impact of reputational losses of service providers has not received as much attention. Due to irregularities in their audit procedures with respect to Enron, Arthur Andersen recently suffered significant reputational losses that provide a unique opportunity to examine the impact of these losses on their clients.
A recent paper published by Chaney and Philipich (2002) also investigates the impact of the Enron audit failure on auditor reputation and specifically the stock price of other Arthur Andersen clients. Our study differentiates itself from the recent work by Chaney and Philipich (2002) in two ways. First, we focus on the certifying and monitoring role of auditors. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms issuing equities experience an adverse selection problem due to asymmetric information between managers and investors about firm value. The stock prices of firms issuing equities tend to decline when they announce seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) or experience underpricing at initial public offerings (IPOs). Therefore, firms tend to employ the reputation of financial intermediaries to mitigate this problem in equity offerings. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) find that the quality of auditing mitigates the negative stock price reaction to the announcement of a SEO. Also, Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991) develop models in which audit quality reduces IPO underpricing, and Balvers, McDonald, and Miller (1988) and Beatty (1989) find that firms employing a Big Eight auditor experience less underpricing. Because Arthur Andersen loses its reputation over the period of the Enron saga, we expect that the firms audited by Arthur Andersen might be negatively affected when they issue equities over the sample period as compared to other firms.
Second, we focus on whether the firm size of Arthur Andersen clients affects the magnitude of the stock price decline of the clients. Chaney and Philipich (2002) find that the stock price of Arthur Andersen clients decreases around the Arthur Andersen events over the period, October 2001 to March 2002, due to the reputational losses of Arthur Andersen. They investigate the effect of the events on only large firms. Myers and Majluf (1984) imply that the certifying and monitoring role is of more importance to young firms with more growth opportunities. Accordingly, we can expect that small Andersen clients lose more value. However, Chaney and Philipich (2002) argue that a large firm's managers have the ability and the incentive to manage earnings. Therefore, if large firms have reports that are more complex and less transparent, the market discounts the quality of these reports. They expect that large Andersen clients lose more value. Small firms rely on the reputation of financial intermediaries because they tend to have more asymmetric information. Therefore, we need to investigate whether small firms or large firms are more affected by the events of Enron and Arthur Andersen.
We first investigate the effect of the declining reputation of Arthur Andersen on the announcement effect of SEOs. We examine 39 SEOs audited by Arthur Andersen and 124 SEOs audited by other Big Five firms over the period, October 2001 to August 2002. We find that, when they announce a SEO, firms audited by Arthur Andersen see a decrease in stock prices that is two percent greater than that experienced by firms audited by other Big Five firms. The strong negative reaction to the SEO for the Andersen clients remains significant after controlling for other determinants of the stock price reaction to the announcements of SEOs. The result is statistically significant, and is also economically significant. For a median firm in our sample, the firm loses $31.4 million more when it announces a SEO. In addition, we examine the difference of SEO underpricing between Arthur Andersen clients and other firms at offering dates, and we do not find any significant difference. The results mean that the effect of the reputational loss of an auditor on seasoned equity offering is fully reflected at the announcement of SEOs.
Second, we examine IPO underpricing in a sample of firms audited by Arthur Andersen to investigate whether the effect of Arthur Andersen on an equity offering is present for IPO firms. The importance of this sample is also enhanced by the fact that the prospectuses that we reviewed cited the use of Arthur Andersen as an auditor as an additional risk factor in an IPO. We do not find, however, that these firms experience unusual underpricing. large firms underperforms the market, but a portfolio of small firms does not underperform the market. This result is consistent with Chaney and Philipich's (2002) argument that the market reaction might be related to the manager's incentive to manipulate the financial statements.
The next section describes the recent history of Arthur Andersen and Enron, Section 3 reviews the relevant literature and develops hypotheses, Section 4 describes the data and presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Enron and Arthur Andersen
Enron began in 1985 due to a merger between Houston Natural Gas and
InterNorth of Omaha, Nebraska and was designed to create the first nationwide natural gas pipeline system. During the 1990s, Enron entered into utilities trading and became number seven on Fortune magazine's list of the 500 largest firms in the United States.
However, during most of the 1990s, Enron executives and directors created a series of off-book partnerships that they used to hide millions of dollars of debt while allowing the executives and directors to make substantial profits. All of these partnerships were approved by Enron's board of directors and reviewed by Arthur Andersen, the firm's external auditor. Enron experiences the downward path of its stock price throughout 2001 from a high at the end of January of $80 per share to a low at the end of November of $0.26 per share.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
One of the major issues in the literature has been the impact of asymmetric information on security offerings. The pecking order theory, developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) , is based on the idea that insiders know more about their firm's value and future projects than outside investors, and maximize the wealth of existing shareholders. The insiders or managers avoid issuing equity when they believe the firm is undervalued. Consequently, firms tend to experience an adverse selection problem when they issue equities. That is, because investors have incomplete information, they will not be able to distinguish overvalued firms from undervalued firms. However, because they know that firms avoid issuing equities when they are undervalued, investors assume that firms that issue equities are overvalued. Therefore, firms employ financial intermediaries to mitigate the adverse selection problem in an equity offering. The certification and monitoring role by financial intermediaries at an IPO has been extensively analyzed in the literature 3 . The role of auditing firms has been well recognized when firms go to external markets to raise capital. In the IPO market, the higher reputation of auditing firms tends to decrease IPO underpricing for their client firms. Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991) develop models in which audit quality reduces IPO underpricing. Empirically, Balvers, McDonald, and Miller (1988) and Beatty (1989) Sushka, and Hudson (1990) find that the stock price reaction to the announcement of a seasoned equity offering is a positive function of the quantity of bank debt, the quality of the firm's investment banker, and the quality of the auditing firm. The result indicates that the deteriorating reputation of Arthur Andersen might exacerbate the negative announcement effects of their client firms.
In the accounting literature, DeAngelo's (1981b) definition of audit(or) quality --the probability that the auditor will both discover and report a breach in the client's accounting system -has long been accepted as the industry standard. Further, audit firm size (i.e. 'Big Five' versus non-Big Five) is commonly used as a proxy for audit quality. The rationale for this standard is that larger audit firms supply higher quality because they have more to lose than smaller firms with respect to reputation. 5 In light of recent events, a particularly interesting study by Reynolds (2000) finds that economic dependence (within a particular office) does not cause Big Five auditors to report more favorably. In fact, Reynolds' findings support the notion that reputation protection dominates auditor behavior.
In finance too, the literature ties quality to reputation. In fact, a firm's ability to repeatedly deliver goods and/or services of high quality is the cornerstone of the reputation building process (Klein and Leffler (1981); Shapiro (1983) ). Additionally, numerous studies have examined the tradeoff between preserving reputation and the potential gains related to providing a low quality product and found that for firms that expect continued operations, the benefits do not outweigh the costs.
6
Our concern is more specific. We are interested in the effect of reputation when a professional service provider's reputation can impact the market value of their client and the client's stakeholders rely on the service provider to mitigate the asymmetric information problem that has been shown to lead to market failure. 7 Carter and Manaster (1990) find a negative relation between initial public offering (IPO) underpricing and underwriter reputation. More importantly, Carter and Manaster (1990) provide evidence that low dispersion issuers signal their low risk characteristics by engaging prestigious underwriters who, in order to preserve their high reputation, market only IPOs of low dispersion firms. Megginson and Weiss (1990) find that the presence of venture capitalists reduces IPO underpricing in a sample of firms in the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] . Similarly, the choice of auditor also provides firms with an opportunity to signal their value. Thus, the investment bank, the venture capitalist, and 6 See Maksimovic and Titman (1991) for a detailed theoretical treatment of this topic. 7 See Akerlof (1970) the auditing firm (i.e. the service providers) assume both a certification and a monitoring role.
The literature based on asymmetric information implies that the certifying and monitoring role is more important to small and young firms with more growth opportunities. It also implies that the reputation of an auditor is more important to IPO firms. However, Chaney and Philipich (2002) argue that large firms are often viewed as having the ability and the incentive to manage earnings. Therefore, if large firms have reports that are more complex and less transparent, the market discounts the quality of these reports. They predict that the deteriorating reputation of Arthur Andersen affects larger firms more severely.
As noted previously, prior studies have typically considered the use of a Big
Five audit firm as a proxy for a quality audit. 8 However, due to the signaling effect of engaging a Big Five audit firm, the vast majority of large, publicly traded firms in the United States engage Big Five firms. Until now, it has been difficult to test the differences in quality among audit firms and its impact on their clients due to the virtual oligopoly that these large audit firms enjoy and the minimal variation between them.
With the series of events surrounding Arthur Andersen and their indictment for fraud in relation to a major audit client, we have the opportunity to examine a service provider that has experienced a reputational loss. The magnitude of this failure and the existence of other concurrent failures greatly reduce the probability that Arthur Andersen would both discover and report a breach in a client's accounting system. By definition, then, Arthur Andersen has exhibited a reduction in quality and therefore reputation. When compared to prior empirical evidence suggesting that such an event is not expected, this loss raises many new empirical questions.
We focus on the impact of auditor failure and the subsequent decline in the auditor's reputation on auditee stock performance. We test the relation between an auditing firm's (here, Arthur Andersen's) changing reputation and their client's stock returns. We categorize the clients in three ways: 1) firms issuing seasoned equity; 2) IPO firms; 3) auditing clients in 2001. Specifically, we divide 2001 auditing clients into small firms and large firms based on market capitalization to investigate the relation between firm size and auditee stock performance.
If auditors' reputation is a concern to investors, it may be appropriate to consider the retention of a disreputable auditor as a risk factor -particularly for a firm issuing equity. Even some companies mention auditing by Arthur Andersen as a risk factor in the prospectus. In its SEC filing, Inveresk Research Group Inc. said "if Arthur
Andersen becomes unable to make required representations to us or for any other reason (including the loss of key members of our audit team from Arthur Andersen), Arthur
Andersen is unable to provide audit-related services for us in a timely manner." Also, it said that "certain investors, including significant funds and institutional investors, may choose not to hold or invest in securities of a company that does not have current financial reports available." We examine whether or not this risk is priced in the market at the time of IPOs. Also, we examine whether the deteriorating reputation of an auditor affects the reaction to the announcements of SEOs or SEO underpricing.
In summary, we test three main null hypotheses based on the three categories of audit clients and their related circumstances described above. Third, we test the null hypothesis that large firms and small firms experience the same stock performance after their auditor lose its reputation.
The abnormal returns for the small firm portfolio surrounding each event equals those for the large firm portfolio.
Sample Selection and Empirical Results

SAMPLE SELECTION
We use three data sets to test our hypotheses in this research. indicates that the stocks audited by Arthur Andersen lose two percent more compared to other firms when they announce seasoned equity offerings. In model 2, we use the log of market capitalization on the announcement date as a firm size measure instead of the log of proceeds. The results are qualitatively the same as in model 1. The coefficient on the log of market capitalization is positive and insignificant.
[ (2003) finds that SEO underpricing is positively related to offer size, price uncertainty, and the magnitude of pre-offer returns. We examine whether the deteriorating reputation of Andersen affects the underpricing as well as the announcement reaction. The underpricing is measured as the return of offer price to close price on the offering date.
We find that the underpricing of SEOs audited by Andersen is not significantly different from that of other firms. This result indicates that the effect of Andersen's deteriorating reputation on SEOs is fully reflected at the announcements of SEOs.
[ initial returns are regressed on offer size (natural log of the proceeds), standard deviation of daily stock returns during day +21 to day +120 after IPO, underwriter's reputation (natural log of adjusted tombstone ranks), and a dummy variable for venture capital backed IPOs. The coefficient on offer size is positive and insignificant, which is not consistent with Beatty and Ritter (1986) who argue that a smaller offering is more speculative than a large offering. The coefficient on the risk measure, standard deviation of daily stock returns, is negative and insignificant, even though we expect a positive coefficient. The coefficient on underwriter's reputation is significantly negative, which means that prestigious underwriters tend to mitigate the adverse selection problem of IPOs. The dummy variable for a venture capital backed IPO is positively significant, which is not consistent with Megginson and Weiss (1991) .
In model 2, we consider the partial adjustment phenomenon. Hanley (1993) argues that investment banks can have a strong bargaining position when there is high demand for the issue. We introduce the interaction term AboveRange*UnderwriterReputation, which indicates that the offer price is higher than the initial filing range, and underwriter's reputation measure. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive. Also, we introduce the interaction term VCBacked*UnderwriterReputation for venture capital backed IPOs and underwriter reputation measure because venture capital backed IPOs tend to employ more prestigious investment banks. The coefficient on the interaction is insignificantly positive, and the coefficient on dummy variable for venture capital backed IPOs is now negative.
In model 3, we add our key variable to the model --a dummy variable which indicates whether an IPO is audited by Arthur Andersen. The coefficient on the dummy variable is positive and insignificant. We expect that the deteriorating reputation of auditor's reputation should have a negative effect on the IPOs of their client firms.
However, we don't find any significant result in univariate and multivariate tests. We think that the results might come from our limited sample size, or small and young firms might not be affected by the reputational losses of Andersen. We have only nine
IPOs audited by Arthur Andersen in the sample period.
[ We compare firm characteristics between small firms and large firms and present the results in TABLE 6. Firms in a small firm portfolio have much smaller market capitalization and total assets by construction. Specially, we are interested in the market to book ratio of equity and the research and development expense to sales ratio (R&D) 13 . Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms with high growth opportunities have more asymmetric information. These firms need to rely more on the certifying and monitoring role of auditors. We proxy growth opportunities using the market to book ratio of equity and the research and development expense to sales ratio. Interestingly, the mean growth opportunities are not significantly different between the two portfolios.
The leverage of firms in a large firm portfolio is marginally higher, and the mean earnings per share (EPS) are not significantly different.
[ TABLE 6 firms' financial statements tend to be more complex and less transparent, the market discounts the quality of these statements.
[ Chaney and Philipich's (2002) argument that the market discounts the quality of large firm's more complex and less transparent financial statements. The result that only large firms are affected by Andersen's deteriorating reputation is also consistent with the results from equity offering samples.
The auditor's reputational losses affect seasoned equity issues that tend to be offered by large and established firms, but do not affect new equity issues that tend to be offered by small and young firms.
TABLE 1 Univariate test results on SEO sample
Panel A presents the number of seasoned equity offerings audited by Arthur Andersen and other Big Five firms during 10/16/2001-8/31/2002, the mean offer price, the mean stock price run-up during the estimation period (day -170 to -21), the mean proceeds (in million dollars), the mean market capitalization (in million dollars) on the announcement date, and the mean of adjusted tombstone ranks of underwriters. Also, it shows the test results about whether the means of each variable between twosubsamples are different from each other. 
Panel
